Le rapprochement entre la Corée du Nord et la Corée du Sud
Nul ne peut dire si le sommet
à venir entre la Corée du Nord et la Corée du Sud,
du 12 au 14 juin à Pyongyang, débouchera sur une prochaine
réunification du pays. Mais il faut se souvenir que la rapidité
du processus en Allemagne avait surpris l'ensemble des observateurs et
des hommes politiques. L'état de guerre entre les deux pays (depuis
le conflit de 1950-53) reste cependant un problème à régler
en préalable à toute discussion sérieuse en ce sens.
The Other Threats to South Korea
Wed, 4 Oct 2000
The South Korean Defense Ministry has issued its defense spending plan for 2001. But instead of focusing exclusively on North Korea, the new plan calls for dealing with threats from any point of the compass. Increasingly, the militaries of South Korea, Japan and China will expand their areas of concern, as well as their operations. Their operations will increasingly overlap and competition will spread to reshape security throughout Asia.
South Korea's military is expanding its focus beyond North Korea, according to the 2001 defense budget proposed by the South Korea Defense Ministry Oct. 3. While Seoul is still worried about the threat posed by North Korean forces, the new plan increasingly focuses on the waters and airspace around South Korea. The South Korean press has even coined a phrase. One of the largest newspapers, Chosun Ilbo, calls the new strategy "an omni- directional defense posture."
In expanding its areas of concern, South Korea is joining Japan and China in redefining security interests and operational strategies in post-Cold War Northeast Asia. Already some of their operations overlap and will increasingly do so. Beyond the Sea of Japan and the Yellow Sea, however, the three nations have competing strategic and economic interests in developing and maintaining security in the shipping lanes through the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.
In pursuing President Kim Dae Jung's "Sunshine Policy" toward North Korea, Seoul has tried to balance increased economic and social cooperation with the North while maintaining a sufficiently defensive posture to dissuade a North Korean attack. The announced strategy shift serves to deflect North Korean criticism of South Korea's military growth and continued relations with United States forces.
Beyond the benefits for negotiation, however, are concerns about South
Korea's security interests amid a shift in Asian strategic
relations. South Korea is attempting to end its long-standing dependence
on the United States for security. And more immediately, Seoul is concerned
with the expanding security spheres of Japan and China, which overlap its
interests and increase the chances of confrontation.
The fall of the Soviet Union and the Asian financial crisis brought an end to the nearly unquestioned reliance of South Korea and Japan on the United States. Washington has redefined its strategic relations with Japan, urging Tokyo to take a greater role in its own security. Japan has done this with gusto, expanding the roles and interoperability of its forces, launching regional initiatives for joint maritime patrols from the Andaman Sea to the Sea of Japan. Tokyo has also engaged in military talks with countries from India to Singapore to Russia.
At the same time, China has begun to take steps to increase operations
beyond its own shores, building bases on islands in the
Spratlys, devising tactics to allow naval exercises beyond normal ranges
and taking delivery of a Russian-made Sovremenny class destroyer. While
China's blue water ambitions remain distant, the military has declared
a "first island defense line" in which China will be able to defend interests
within a line marked by the Daiyoutai islands, Taiwan, the Spratly islands
and Singapore,
according to a recent report in Japan's Yomiuri Shimbun.
With these events, South Korea's 2001 defense budget includes several new pieces of equipment to extend its capabilities as well. Seoul intends to add three Aegis-class destroyers in the next 10 years; AWACS, aerial refueling aircraft in the next five years; and new submarines, fighter aircraft, helicopters, surface-to-air missiles and unmanned reconnaissance aircraft.
Ultimately, Japan, China and South Korea are all seeking to exert control over the same stretch of waters: from Japan to Singapore to India and the Middle East. Currently, the Japanese enjoy the greatest military capability with their naval forces. But they are somewhat constrained by political factors revolving around the nation's interpretation of its pacifist constitution. Japan's constitutional taboo is slowly fading, however, and increased military contact with Russia, Singapore and India is expanding its acceptable operational horizons.
China's ambitions remain constrained by financial concerns, including
a heavy focus on its land forces. However, its submarine
fleet and new expenditures on anti-ship missiles present a potential
threat to shipping and security in the South China Sea.
In addition, China has been working with Myanmar to establish naval
bases on the Andaman Sea, which would give Chinese forces bases on both
ends of the Strait of Malacca.
Traditional animosities are stirring again among China, Japan and South
Korea. The new potential for a reunified Korea raises
concerns from Japan and China. Competition for resources and
markets among the three is increasing, with the United States no longer
serving as a moderating influence.
Improvements in forces and increased operational areas of Chinese, Japanese and South Korean forces over the next 10 years will alter the dynamics of the security situation in East Asia, eventually raising the possibility of confrontation among the emerging powers.